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Uncertain futures: The problem of defining risk 
 
Defined at its simplest, risk describes our uncertain relation to the future. That 
this relation is ‘complex and ambivalent’,1 manifesting in multiple and varied 
permutations, follows logically from the fact that at different times and in different 
places, precisely what constitutes a risk – that which, in other words, makes our 
relation to the future perceptibly uncertain – assumes different forms. Risk crosses 
borders and boundaries, cultures and histories, and as it migrates it takes on new 
forms, new uncertainties. How we interpret and respond to these uncertainties – 
for instance, whether they are seen as holding promise or threat, whether they are 
embraced or avoided – conditions how we approach risk across its numerous and 
diverse contexts. Indeed, as Ulrich Beck, arguably the preeminent theorist of risk, 
notes, ‘[I]t is cultural perception and definition that constitute risk.’2 In this light, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that risk proves constitutively resistant to precise definition:3 
‘risks have something unreal about them’ suggests Ulrich Beck. ‘In a fundamental 
sense they are both real and unreal.’4 
Yet despite its elusiveness, there can be little doubt that a continued investigation 
of risk remains a pressing task in the contemporary world. Indeed, writing from 
the midst of the coronavirus pandemic – as individuals, communities, societies and 
governments all struggle to weigh the existential risk posed by the virus itself against 
the socio-economic risk it has apparently occasioned5 – it becomes apparent not 
only that risk lies at the heart of our political discourse, but that it also constitutes 
an ideological battlefield where the value of human life (that is of visceral, embodied 
beings, each with a life) is pitted against the value of the market (an abstract and a 
self-organizing system, habitually treated as an organic lifeform if not a governing 
deity).6 That these risks and the scale of their impact are asymmetrically distributed 
both within and between societies and nations has become increasingly clear. The 
risks posed by the coronavirus not only fluctuate from place to place depending in 
large part on financial resources and government policies regarding its containment, 
but also seem unambiguously tied to a range of variables including age, gender, race, 
socio-economic precarity, body type and pre-existing medical conditions, many of 
which intersect with one another in the context of the individual to constitute what we 
might call a vulnerable subject or a subject at risk.7 The capacity or incapacity of a state 
to respond adequately to the challenges posed to its structures and processes by the 
vulnerable subject – its capacity for accommodating and defending, rather than simply 
excluding or isolating the vulnerable subject – offers a compelling proxy measure of 
the politics of risk. 
Although it is tempting to say that the coronavirus pandemic and the profoundly 
unequal politics of risk it exposes are singular to our contemporary reality, most 
significant crises of the twenty-first century exhibit a similar tendency towards 
the abstraction of risk: the legacy of the 9/11 attacks in the ‘War on Terror’ where 
ongoing risk has been used as the pretext for waging unjust wars; the 2008 economic 
crash and the ascendency of austerity economics which place an abstraction of 
economic recovery ahead of the social systems that protect the vulnerable; and the 
rapid approach of ecological catastrophe, and the displacement of accountability 
from the so-called centre to the periphery in the form of what Nixon has called 
the ‘outsourcing of environmental crises’.8 This politics of risk thus proves to be 
both prevalent and persistent, and has been the subject of numerous studies in 
the recent past.9 Despite the considerable variation in their precise commitments 
and aims, what emerges almost universally is a sustained concern with inequalities 
of wealth and the ways in which these inequalities manifest on a global scale. 
While the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens remains paradigmatic in 
this regard, there has also been an increasing recognition that it is impossible 
to grasp inequalities of wealth without simultaneously addressing asymmetries 
of power. The contemporary understanding of the latter rests principally on the 
critical revision of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty and 
an elaboration of Michel Foucault’s understanding of biopower, culminating in a 
series of significant works of political philosophy at the turn of the millennium, 
most notably by Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler. The conception of the 
vulnerable subject that emerges from Agamben’s and Butler’s work differs starkly 
from the global subject that underwrites earlier studies of risk. For Agamben, 
this subject is made manifest in the figure of homo sacer who is excluded from 
the ordinary application of law and thus reduced to bare life;10 for Butler, it is the 
precarious subject, who possesses a ‘primary vulnerability’ that emerges from the 
tension between the visceral character of all human life and the fact that the subject 
is always also socially constituted.11 In both cases, the subject at risk clarifies 
what it means to live in the contemporary world, a world suspended between 
two competing yet inextricable paradigms of global (dis)order: a global world of 
interconnectedness and incorporation on the one hand, and the reassertion of the 
sovereign state and its capacity for separation and exclusion on the other. It is in 
this light that the subject at risk – the vulnerable subject – becomes not only the 
exemplum for rethinking the horizons of the political body, but also, in broader 
terms, the body politic itself. 
 
Reclaiming value: The body at risk and the radicality of value 
 
Opposing the dominant trend towards abstraction in the contemporary governance of 
risk (i.e. in its identification, calculation and distribution), and countering the ways in 
which this abstraction is increasingly employed to determine and govern the lives of 
everyday people, it is necessary not only to pay closer attention to the singularity of the 
vulnerable body, or the body at risk, but to attempt to effect a shift in the understanding 
of what it might mean to take risks. While as a concept risk is unavoidably imbricated 
with questions of loss and gain, the wholesale assumption that such losses or gains 
should be principally economic is finally a question of ideology rather than necessity. 
In this light, the question becomes: how might we begin to recover the vulnerable lives 
that are exploited by abstract models of risk? How, in short, do we reclaim a notion 
of gain which amounts to more than the accrual of wealth by a capitalist elite, but a 
gain which transforms the everyday lives of vulnerable subjects? How might risk be 
redistributed so that the bodies and lives of those most at risk are not the very ones 
constantly placed at risk for the sake of financial gain? 
It is only in responding to such questions that it becomes possible to begin to 
reconceptualize risk as distinct from the processes of abstraction that inform the logic 
of neoliberal capitalism as it seeks to exploit uncertainty regarding the future for the 
purpose of gain.12 This reconceptualization must of necessity begin by challenging 
the question of agency, and what it means or might mean to actively take a risk. In 
the context of the ascendancy of global capitalism the taking of risk has principally 
been used to refer to economic loss or gain – a context which habitually involves the 
displacement of risk from the centre to the periphery, from the wealthy to the poor or 
from the powerful to the vulnerable.13 In this light, identifying a possible route to risktaking 
as a generative or recuperative act must start by challenging the assumption that 
risk can ever be adequately conceptualized in terms of abstraction, and rather insisting 
on the materiality of the world to which the logic of risk is applied, and in particular 
emphasizing the irremissibility of the embodied experiences of the vulnerable subjects 
at its centre. By drawing the viscerality of the subject at risk into focus, it becomes 
clearer precisely what is at stake in the abstraction of risk for economic gain: an 
implicit decision regarding which lives are worth saving and which can be sacrificed 
for the sake of economic growth. The process of recovering risk must, therefore, 
begin by refusing the disposability of any human life and affirming that the radical 
vulnerability of all life, and fragility of the systems that produce and sustain it, is the 
source of incalculable value.14 
 
 
Beyond representation: The return of the sublime 
and the aesthetics of risk 
 
Since risk may be regarded as inherent to existence by the sheer fact of the uncertainty 
of the future, it follows that it is only by challenging the ways in which risk and value 
are tied together in the present that it becomes possible to reconceptualize risk within 
the political sphere as a source of potential rather than hazard. In this process it is vital 
to keep in mind the rift that emerges between the dominant regimes of contemporary 
risk, the visceral and the abstract: between, on the one hand, vulnerable bodies, 
fragile ecosystems, precarious labour or those things at risk; and, on the other, risk as 
something to be actively produced and harnessed by various methods of calculation 
and redistribution. That the first remains in large part subjugated to the second should 
also be a major source for concern. This subjugation reflects the ongoing acceleration of 
late capitalism and its manifestation as neoliberal society where the illusion of freedom 
is fostered to produce docile subjects who, accepting the truth that risk is pervasive, 
have lost the capacity to distinguish different regimes of risk from one another. What 
might it mean in this context to take the right risks? 
To take the right risks begins with affirming the subject at risk: recognizing that 
bodily fragility and vulnerability are indeed singular, and yet that it is precisely this 
shared viscerality that makes singular lives comparable and hence undermines the 
elevation of some lives as inherently more valuable than others. Since risk is radical not 
only to every life, but to every formulation of the future (and hence unavoidable), it is 
only by beginning again with risk, by radically questioning if not actively undermining 
its connection to economic value, and critically interrogating its grounding in the 
more fundamental value of all human life, that it becomes possible to imagine what it 
might mean to take the right risks. Thus to rethink risk in terms of its post-economic 
potential requires us to begin with the embodied or visceral subject and to place under 
significant scrutiny any conception of subjectivity that rests on the abstraction of the 
subject to a regime of calculation. In other words, to rethink risk we need to rethink 
the ways in which we represent risk, and how these representations are imbricated with 
embodied subjects. 
The problem of representing risk is at the heart of Scott Lash’s epochal essay, ‘Risk 
Cultures’. Taking issue with what he views as the two dominant strands of risk thinking 
– the realist and the constructivist15– Lash proposes to shift the terms of discussion 
from risk society to risk culture. Following a broadly Kantian schema, he suggests 
that while the concept of society hinges on an epistemological or cognitive reflexivity, 
culture, by contrast, depends on aesthetic reflexivity.16 The latter, Lash claims, is more 
appropriate to understanding the complex set of cultural events and practices that 
emerge to reflect on contemporary risk.17 In particular, it is an aesthetic of the sublime 
that, Lash contends, provides a close cognate for conceptualizing risk. Both, after all, 
address the figure of an unknowable threat. As Jean-Francois Lyotard recognizes, 
‘The sublime is kindled by the threat of nothing further happening.’18 A sense of great 
risk, then, that provokes a visceral affect which confirms: ‘What is sublime is the 
feeling that something will happen, despite everything within this threatening void, 
that something will take “place” and will announce that everything is not over.’19 It is 
in this sense that the aesthetics inspired by the sublime yearn to recover the future, 
despite the sublime initially appearing to place it in jeopardy.20 Although the Kantian 
sublime ultimately elevates our cognitive capacity to subdue a sense of imminent risk, 
subsequent phenomenologists – Merleau-Ponty perhaps foremost among them – have 
convincingly demonstrated that cognition, in fact, is always an embodied process. In 
this light the connection between the sublime and risk emerges not from their shared 
abstraction, but rather precisely in their viscerality: in aesthetics, the sublime makes 
itself known as gut feeling. On this significant point, it is worth quoting Lash at some 
length: 
 
Aesthetic judgements of the sublime expose bodies with lack, expose open bodies 
to the ravages of contingency … Hence we also experience this as confirming 
our finitude. Risks and threats, thus experienced and subsumed under neither 
determinate judgement of the understanding nor the judgements and syntheses of 
the imagination therefore bring us in touch with our finitude. Kant called this the 
‘terrible sublime’ in which dangers were actually physical. This is a very important 
means by which we ascribe meaning not only to risks but also to the sensibilities 
of risk culture.21 
 
It is on account of this close alliance between the aesthetics of risk and the sublime – the 
latter which, as Lyotard notes, acts as ‘witness to the fact that there is indeterminacy’22 
– that we have occasion to shift focus from the demand of finding an adequate means 
of representing risk as abstraction to exploring the means of witnessing its visceral 
manifestation in the subject at risk. Much as in the case of the sublime, such exemplary 
cases must be both conceptual and visceral, navigating rather than subsuming the 
latter under the former (as might be the Kantian claim).23 
The work of US poet Rob Halpern instantiates this set of tensions in the conception 
of risk with both clarity and force. Yet to read Halpern’s work in such exemplary 
terms – as a vehicle for the sublime presentation of contemporary risk, and thus, in 
particular, for the recovery of risk as a visceral rather than an abstract phenomenon – 
it is necessary first to recall in greater detail what was merely alluded to above: that 
risk as a concept never emerges in isolation. Of particular significance in this regard 
is the argument advanced by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in What Is Philosophy?, 
which remains almost certainly one of the most incisive accounts of the concept as 
concept. A concept, they claim, must of necessity be understood as a dynamic process, 
a multiplicity characterized by its capacity for both generating and maintaining a 
complex set of relations that are at once internal and external to the concept itself: 
internal, since the concept gathers together heterogeneous elements (or components) 
that persist in a dynamic relation to one another;24 external, since no concept is defined 
in isolation, but always emerges in relation to other concepts.25 Concepts resonate – 
‘each in itself and every one in relation to all others’26 – and in resonating constitute an 
intervention: an event27 that inaugurates a novel way of addressing a problem which 
has been intuited yet which in isolation remains frustratingly inarticulate and vague.28 
It is in this dynamic conceptual sense, in this system of resonances, that Halpern’s 
poetry – ranging across pressing themes such as vulnerability, crisis, disaster and threat – 
situates itself against an horizon of risk.29 It is thus difficult to pinpoint the precise 
subject of Halpern’s work. Addressed as a whole, his poetry might be described as a 
sustained aesthetic interrogation of the politics of vulnerability: an exposition of the 
multiple asymmetries that scar the lives of those most at risk. The everyday existence of 
vulnerable subjects remains in significant ways illegible within the ‘normal’ operation 
of society, predicated as it is on the capacity of a hegemon to effect various protocols 
of inclusion or exclusion,30 perpetuating the conditions which allow the structural 
and often direct violence that makes a politics of exclusion and exception the normal 
condition of existence for vulnerable individuals and groups. The impossible challenge 
taken up by Halpern’s poetry, then, is to discover a means of restoring legibility and 
presence to those who have been erased or rendered illegible. 
By lyricizing abjection and eroticizing loss, this poetic work constitutes an ethically 
charged corpus that not only reflects on risk, but itself also takes risks. Incorporating 
the insights of psychoanalysis, queer studies, political theory, the critique of neoliberal 
economics and avant-garde poetics, Halpern addresses a constellation of risks that 
emerge in the aftermath of the 9/11 events of 2001 in two interconnected volumes of 
poetry (the final instalments of a tetralogy): Music for Porn, which addresses the often 
fetishized figure of the injured, maimed or dead solider; and Common Place, which 
interrogates the complex imbrication of, and occluded access to, mourning and desire 
which become problematically abstracted through the autopsy report of a deceased 
Guantanamo Bay detainee. Despite obvious differences, the soldier and the detainee 
become exemplary figures in the poet’s attempt to reclaim a degree of legibility for the 
vulnerable subject. 
 
Representing risk: Militarized capital 
and the nation at risk 
 
Within the prevailing conditions of post-9/11 risk – a situation where the state cooption 
of the existential threat posed by global terrorism is used as a pretext for waging 
illegal wars that consistently place economic interests above human lives – what 
unites vulnerable subjects is the shared danger of their abstraction to a mere statistic. 
Under such conditions, bodies, identities, histories and possibilities are transformed 
by the techniques and technologies of contemporary biopolitics and its alliance with 
neoliberal capitalism, as the deep complexities of human society and its shifting 
patterns of conflict and risk are flattened into biopolitical data and human algorithms31 
to constitute the new basis of informational capital. Reduced to such terms, oblique and 
unpredictable kinships between even the most unlikely subjects become increasingly 
probable on account of their shared vulnerability, offering a faint outline for a politics 
of possibility recovered from its reduction to probability. 
Yet if their common ground is found in their shared biopolitical abstraction, it 
should also be recalled that it is the raw fact of embodiment that underwrites even 
the possibility of such biopolitical abstraction to begin with. What happens, then, if 
abstraction is elevated and the body ignored or – as in the case of the solider and 
detainee – actively destroyed so that only the abstraction remains? Can there be a 
body politic (which is to say a political aggregation we might otherwise term society) 
if the most overtly political bodies can be reduced to an idea, arbitrarily memorialized 
or redacted from history at will, or, more terrifying still, destroyed or consumed by a 
collective appetite for catharsis or revenge? 
Similar questions animate Sianne Ngai’s perceptive analysis of Music for Porn, 
which she identifies as an allegorical vehicle for coming to terms with the unresolved 
contradictions in the Marxist conception of abstract labour. In a contemporary 
world so thoroughly desensitized by hyper-commodification and an over-exposure 
to spectacular violence, Halpern’s radical poetic labour struggles to reanimate the 
abstracted soldier through the poetic encoding of a visceral and habitually culturally 
disavowed desire: 
 
Halpern, the body of The Soldier is one abstracted at multiple levels: as a 
national representation … as a corpse removed from public view; as a homosexual 
icon … and as an allegory of value. At the very same time, this abstract-allegorical 
body is incongruously presented as the visceral object of the poet’s lust, sexual 
fantasy, and a range of conflicting emotions: love, hate, disgust, shame.32 
 
Tying together Halpern’s diverse and difficult meditation on the erotics of wartime 
capital is the figure of a solider: a soldier, importantly, not a marine; a figure remarkable, 
then, precisely because he is the embodiment of a transfigured ordinariness. The solider, 
generically, is the good son of the working-class family: a figure notable at once for 
his heroic resilience, yet equally heroic, as national abstraction, for his expendability. 
Indeed, the solider embodies all the impossibilities of liberal democracy-become empire: 
a national fetish that the poet believes must become the object of what he 
terms a ‘devotional kink’33 in order for us to confront the depth of the imperial violence 
that moves through our world, placing us all so deeply at risk. 
Sometimes wounded, sometimes maimed, but at others the sacralized corpse of the 
sacrificed hero, this solider ties together the diverse range of forms Halpern investigates 
in the volume. He animates longer essayistic reflections that draw together an incisive 
post-Marxist critique of neoliberalism. He provides a common point of access to 
fragmentary and often disarmingly delicate prose poems that map the crossing of erotic 
and martial affect. He grounds the complexity of the ‘patterned objectivist lyrics’,34 both 
drawing on and participating in a long tradition of experimentation with the line in 
American poetry – sometimes in its discreteness; sometimes multiple enjambed – that 
runs from Whitman, through Stein, to Olson and his successors. 
Exemplary in this regard is the ‘MY OPERATIVES’ sequence in Music for Porn, 
which reflects, at the level of form, a more profound and traumatic incongruity which 
the poet must risk in struggling to find an adequate means for representing or making 
sense of the senseless: the aforementioned entanglement of the martial and the erotic 
within the neoliberal abstraction of the human subject; the exemplary figure of the 
solider reduced thus by the abstracting force of capital to mere ‘waste’35 or ‘meat’.36 
 
Consider the following: 
 
Now that we’ve seduced the soldier my own thought 
Thins to a fevered nought there never having been before 
The war things were identical whereas now difference 
Reigns in names for annihilation being mine own peace 
And stability industry ricochets and ducks the largest 
Private army a one man truth squad alone dodging total 
Intelligence solutions chop off surveillance […];37 
or the more explicit passage from the same sequence: 
Lick yr wounds it said as if the words would make 
Me one with the current traumatic neuroses of peace 
That’s how we live on waste he said crawling out 
Under the dead weight a carcass had come rising 
When he saw me on my knees his dick in my mouth 
Creaming him crushed beneath the weight of nations.38 
 
That the poetic line simultaneously connects and separates, makes concrete and 
abstracts, is of considerable significance here. The line becomes itself a model of relation, 
exposing the vertiginous tensions between, on the one hand, the inextricability of war 
and capital which become abstractions of risk and, on the other, the poetic sublimation 
of proscribed sex and desire as visceral figurations of this abstraction. 
One might say that by tracing through this figure of the solider the ways in which 
the poetical line both facilitates and interrupts relation, Halpern gives expression to an 
urgent political vision in Music for Porn. In short, what the poetic line risks in formal 
terms – in its restructuring of our collective access to the disavowed connections 
between explicit violence and explicit sex together subsumed under the sign of capital 
– is mirrored in Halpern’s reflection on the inextricability of borderlines, battle lines, 
lines of production and, perhaps most saliently, lines of credit – that is to say, the 
risky apertures of speculation that emerge when we confront the inextricability of the 
nation-state, the military-industrial complex and the transnational flows of capital that 
drive and sustain these two. 
Indeed, Halpern’s solider is able to exemplify the interdependency of state, war and 
capital so forcefully precisely because he allows for what the poet terms an ‘affective 
tuning’ – a realignment of the private and public, the intimate and social – to constitute 
a distinctive and disturbing expression of political emotion. On the one hand, the 
soldier’s vulnerability evokes pathos because it invokes relation at the scale of the 
individual and, particularly, the individual within the context of the family: the solider 
is a son, a husband, a father, a brother. On the other hand, the soldier is understood 
as the embodiment of a transhistorical trajectory of heroic political subjectivity, the 
everyday hero of an American poetic mythography. For this reason a further line – a 
genealogical line that binds nationhood to war in the American literary imagination – 
assumes preeminence. Tracing this line from Virgil, through Whitman, to the present, 
Halpern identifies an 
 
affective tuning of a military figure … only fully realized in our own present … 
To organize prosodically an experience of war, Whitman links uncoded affects, 
say a certain unsingable tenderness for a dead soldier’s body … to over-coded 
attachment love of nation, fervor for democracy … To be that sacrificial body, a 
soldier’s corpse is drained of its historicity bare life, dead meat, taboo just as the 
nation’s mourning is hygienically cleaned of partisan militant subjectivity.39 
 
Recognized as the subject of a long genealogy that links eros and political violence, the 
principal question at the heart of Music for Porn is incisively phrased by the poet himself: 
‘How to unbind this eros from martial interests, wrest an openness to penetration 
away from sovereign ends? How to disentangle my desire from a long genealogy of 
homoeroetic camaraderie embedded in histories of empire and nation, but without 
denying these entanglements?’40 Halpern’s fragmented response to this impossible 
demand emerges through a sustained poetic reimagining of a queer affection that risks 
transgressing the increasingly militarized line of abstraction. Realigning queer affect 
from within explicit fragments, exploring the significance of inappropriate cathexis, 
this is a poetry that takes the right risks: the risk of insisting that it may yet be possible 
to retrieve a trace of pure value from an economy of pure waste. Another name for this 
trace is the future. 
 
Against risk’s abstractions: The poetics of viscerality 
and the insistence on life 
 
That the concept of risk has shifted, expanded, intensified and accelerated in the 
present digital age is clear from the increasing abstraction of everyday life. The 
embodied subject becomes a digital subject; society itself – which historically has been 
materially located, with concrete infrastructures connecting these locations – becomes 
an increasingly virtual concept, transposed into informational networks, both 
professional and social. Recalling that for Beck, risk is in the first instance a predicate of 
perception,41 what is perceived as risk under such conditions is significantly reshaped 
by its technological abstraction, which makes it increasingly invisible and inaccessible 
not only to the public to which it applies, but also to public scrutiny. Under such 
conditions, the visceral particularity of the embodied subject at risk is all too easily 
lost to a generalized abstraction, and the overwhelming sense of always being at risk. 
It is in recovering not only the particularity but also the localizability and 
viscerality of risk, that Halpern’s poetry has significant implications for contemporary 
risk thinking. He examines arguably the most extreme figures through which the 
abstraction of risk is manifested: the US solider, as both hero and victim, whose body is 
declared disposable and whose future is made expendable for the sake of an imperialist 
concept of nation that has been co-opted by war; and the Guantanamo Bay detainee, 
an anonymized and redacted terror suspect, onto whose body – physically relocated to 
an extra-judicial territory, with or without supporting evidence – the abstracted form 
of national mourning, rage and desire for vengeance are projected. Halpern’s strategy 
for reclaiming these spectral yet persistent figures is radical, and within the normative 
structures of conventional aesthetics, almost unthinkable. The eviscerated subject, the 
subject become object, is reinvigorated and reformed through the libidinal force of 
desire – a defiant queer affect, the taboo of a ‘devotional kink’, to recall Halpern’s terms. 
Probing the relationship between viscerality and abstraction in Halpern’s ouevre 
proves fertile ground for the political discourse on risk. His work makes explicit the 
link between our ‘new age of risk’ and the ways in which the politics of viscerality and 
abstraction are locked into a symmetrical relationship. A turn to the viscerality of the 
subject seems imperative in this light, interrogating the conceptual imbrication of risk, 
vulnerability, precariousness and fragility by bringing these into a sustained dialogue 
with not only the material aspects of viscerality – that is, the immanence of the body 
– but also its symbolic manifestations in terms of an embodied internality, concealed 
functions, enclosed hierarchies and occluded processes. 
The significance of viscerality and the viscera to human culture is considerable; their 
material and metaphysical import manifest across a range of cultures and histories. 
Mythology and religion are replete with visceral practices, from divine punishments to 
visceral offerings, the divination practices of auguries, to the quasi-scientific medical 
theory of the humours. We might say that our systems of knowledge flow through 
our insides, but equally that our insides provide an important model for functionality, 
from medicine to political theory, where, among many other examples, we discover 
its metaphorical centrality to concepts such as the body politic in Hobbe’s Leviathan, 
and its material centrality to contemporary biopolitics as envisioned by Foucault (who 
famously draws on the account of the public evisceration and execution of an attempted 
regicide at the start of Discipline and Punish).42 What is worth noting, however, has 
less to do with the historical minutiae of this or similar accounts, than with the fact 
that the internal functioning of the body and the internal functioning of political 
systems are bound together through a particular representational model. Because it is 
the generality of this representational model that makes it translatable, and also that 
accounts for the reciprocal significance of systems of aesthetic representation to the 
ways in which we understand viscerality, along with related bodily categories of flesh 
and incarnation, blood and circulation. 
An interesting and relevant modulation of viscerality – one that relates closely to 
questions of political and aesthetic representation – emerges in the recent work of 
Achille Mbembe. Drawing attention to the pending eclipse of the modern political 
subject by the advent and rise of new data-driven technologies, Mbembe outlines a 
dystopian future where data has ‘overcode[d] the subject’, the culmination of ‘multiple 
wave fronts of calculation [that] expand throughout the planet, incorporating more 
and more life and matter into systems of abstraction and “machine reasoning”’.43 
Under such conditions, which are in many respects simply the culmination of 
the neoliberal logic of the intensified abstraction of capital that characterizes the 
contemporary understanding of risk, the reassertion of the viscerality of the subject 
becomes eminently political. Indeed, as Mbembe notes in a different context, the 
upsurge of affect above reason as the governing principle of much contemporary 
political activism is significant.44 If the danger of abstraction resides in an unmediated 
knowledge, a knowledge, in other words, that is able to bypass reason, the politics of 
viscerality constitutes a new political medium through which the political subject may 
be expressed. 
In this light, the vulnerable political subject as interpellated in terms of its viscerality 
might be defined as 
 
one who is so disabled by all kinds of power structures, that he or she is rendered 
physically ill with rage, grief and fear, none of which seem[s] to have an outlet … 
[T]his visceral subject, inhabits a frustrated body he cannot call home ….a body 
that is unable to shout in the face of the apparent impunity and mercilessness of 
the violence and horror inflicted on it by various structures of power.45 
 
While in one sense the recovery of the political body of the vulnerable subject 
promises a means of countering its exponential abstraction by these structures of 
power, it remains unclear to Mbembe that this viscerality, occupying a space shaped 
by violence, is able to distinguish clearly between its constructive and destructive 
potential. One possible reason for this ambiguity relates to the fact that the politics 
of viscerality, in an ironically similar manner to the politics of abstraction, has in his 
view largely abandoned reason or the capacity to ‘properly identify the threshold that 
distinguishes between the calculable and the incalculable, the quantifiable and the 
unquantifiable, the computable and the incomputable’.46 The challenge in this light 
becomes how to imagine and then represent the visceral subject as a ‘reasonable’ 
threshold figure, engaged in both the macrological struggle to lay claim to rights 
and protections for all those who are most vulnerable or at risk and the micrological 
struggle of the right of the particular individual to persist in a state of vulnerability, 
recognizing in vulnerability itself a source of shared existential modality regarding the 
human condition.47 In this light, the visceral subject, understood as an exemplar of 
the vulnerable subject, is one whose bodily being has been so abstracted by structures 
of power that it is necessary to find new means of presenting and representing the 
embodied condition in order to reclaim the right to a material political resistance. The 
shift that is required to accomplish this is then precisely from a reactionary politics of 
viscerality to a generative poetics of viscerality. 
Recalling the connections exposed above between viscerality and the sublime, 
it is perhaps no surprise that there is no conventional mode of representation that 
proves entirely adequate to this task. A similar problem haunts Halpern’s poetry and 
nowhere more intensely than in Common Place. The collection draws its content 
from public records which provide an oblique and incomplete view of the statesanctioned 
activities at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre (often simply called 
GITMO), which is perhaps the most ominous manifestation of the exceptional logic 
of the so-called ‘War on Terror’. In Common Place, Halpern directly addresses the 
effects of a radically asymmetrical exercise of power on the incarcerated body. The 
autopsy report of a detainee who appears to be a composite figure, the ‘everyman’ of 
illegal detention under a global state of exception, serves as the basis for Halpern’s 
risky poetic reflection. His name is redacted, given to the reader initially in the form 
of a placeholder (__________); yet, his story closely resembles so many reported 
experiences at Guantanamo Bay, including the notorious first suicide (an account of 
whose death has been disputed) of a Yemeni detainee. This confusion and profusion 
of names and identities are the first of many markers of the destructive power of 
biopolitical abstraction which moves through Halpern’s visceral poetics – the ‘my 
solider’ of Music for Porn elided into ‘my detainee’ in Common Place. 
Halpern’s poetry is itself situated in the space of suspended legality, of suspended 
norms or exceptional new norms, which Agamben recognizes in what he terms the 
nomos of the camp48 – ‘the camp [regarded] not as a historical fact and an anomaly 
belonging to the past (even if still verifiable) but in some way as the hidden matrix and 
nomos of the political space in which we are still living’.49 In this extra-legal location – a 
space of suspended legality enforced under the pretext of guaranteeing a securitized 
political freedom, but in reality simply subtracted from material structures and 
processes of accountability – the body of the detainee, reduced to bare life, extinguished 
and then abstracted to a report, becomes the focus of a radical poetic project. Halpern 
sets about translating this autopsy report, the very paradigm of abstract biopolitical 
discourse, into elaborate variations and alternations of lyrical verse and evocative 
prose, manifesting in powerful philosophical reflection, intimate love poetry, dark 
reveries and erotic dreamscapes. 
Whether or not this writing is able to rescue something of the loss of human life it 
sets about retracing, or whether it merely manifests another sort of violence, a charge 
which has been brought to Halpern’s work,50 must of necessity occupy an undecidable 
threshold. It is precisely by occupying this threshold – on one side of which is a quasipornographic 
fantasy, and on the other a devastatingly forensic political critique – that 
Common Place is able to offer a profound and far-reaching reflection on the viscerality 
of contemporary risk. This is a remarkably complex work, punctuated by opaque 
intensities, patterned by erratic repetitions and recurrences, evasive on account of gaps 
and recurrences that require a great deal of time to unfold and decipher. The body of 
the detainee, abstracted through the anonymous and unremitting forensic gaze that 
produces this autopsy report, a gaze which the poet must reproduce time and again, 
poses disturbing questions around the problem of witnessing and complicity. As Bellamy 
notes, ‘The autopsy report feels like vengeance; the detainee may be dead, but the state 
keeps observing him, stripping him of humanity until nothing remains but tissue pulp.’51 
Halpern’s work brings into focus the hidden, raw wounds of a cultural complicity – 
of our witnessing and inaction in the face of ‘state-sponsored brutality’, recognizing that 
the sublime task of poetry lies in its capacity to transfigure this violence ‘into something 
akin to love’.52 To accomplish this, however, the poet must take immense risks, situating 
himself at the very periphery of what is poetically sayable: excepted, degraded and 
abjected for the sake of this love, his words must ‘turn […] the impenetrability of an 
autopsy report toward intelligible joy, its violence, a conjugal bower’.53 In short, then, 
the poet must risk a radical queer desire for the detainee, who, like the solider, must be 
rescued from his abstraction to waste: 
 
This is how the body of a soldier harbors my love for a detainee. The same river 
pours over the one without a drop of that love being subtracted from the other. 
You can see I’m aiming to preserve and nourish both young men under the double 
ray of tenderness and compassion, but these figures are one and the same while my 
yearning drowns his withdrawn form, my need to feel him close overwhelms the 
body’s inaccessibility, giving way to an equal but opposite excess.54 
 
Under the state of exception, the figure of the detainee is divested of all rights, deprived 
of all value and reduced to pure waste. By mobilizing a desire that occupies a threshold 
– between life and death, eros and thanatos, creation and destruction – the poet is able 
to occupy an extreme space in which reality and fantasy both consume and produce 
one another in an attempt to revive and restore the human-made-waste. 
Such spaces of risk often seem to translate into the experience of reading and 
thinking through, or alongside, Halpern’s work. These poems aim to unsettle both 
psychologically and viscerally, testing tolerances and relentlessly interrogating 
the terrifyingly mutual implicitness of the most radical apparent contradictories: 
self-annihilating abjection and world-making desire. Displacing any easy sense of 
coherence and disrupting the reader’s comfortable sense of self-relation, the potential 
of this visceral risk lies in its capacity to generate a radical rift within the abstraction of 
the present. To resist abstraction, to insist on the visceral, however awkward, shameful 
or impossible such visceral affects may be, is also to insist on the political. It is precisely 
because ‘the absent detainee destabilizes all he comes in contact with’55 that Halpern’s 
Common Place is able to constitute an agonistic ground on which the two poles of 
contemporary risk – risk as abstraction and risk as it emerges in the vulnerable subject 
– can be effectively disputed. 
 
The peripheries of risk: The vulnerable body 
and the state of exception 
 
In considering these visceral risks, the precise connection between vulnerability and 
risk, anticipated earlier but not fully explored, becomes a central concern. As suggested 
above, visceral risk is a localization at the level of the body of the vulnerable state of 
being at risk – of being subject to risk or the recipient of risk. In the context of the 
ascendency of risk as abstraction, visceral risks often remain unarticulated or ignored. 
It is taken for granted that we live in precarious times, but the sheer ubiquity of risk has 
the disturbing capacity to make itself into something unexceptional; the anticipated 
horizon of the everyday. 
In this context the contemporary manifestation of risk is comparable to what critics 
of neoliberalism have noted as the normalization of crisis.56 If we exist in a state of 
continual crisis, then crisis loses its capacity to mobilize us one way or another. We 
become increasingly passive, and this passivity has the effect of amplifying existing 
structures of power, providing these with the pretext for exercising their power in 
increasingly unaccountable ways in the name of this crisis – in the name of protecting 
a particular systemic state in a time of crisis. Yet in reality, against this horizon of crisis, 
risk takes on a very specific role or function. It becomes a means of locating crisis – of 
intensifying the situation in which a crisis is registered. In other words, in locating a 
particular risk, there is a move from a situation of general crisis to a situation of specific 
crisis that seems to call for or justify a particular action. 
Yet the location of risk often involves dislocation, the most notable example of 
which the Nazi jurist, Carl Schmitt, theorizes as the state of exception, establishing a 
legal framework through which a state could legally, and often indefinitely, suspend 
the ordinary application of law in response to the identification of a particular 
perceived threat or emergency.57 From this position, exceptional acts are habitually 
taken in the name of security to eliminate risks. Historically, this process has 
invariably involved the displacement and relocation of human beings identified as 
the source of risk: most infamously in the ghettos and extermination camps of Nazi 
Germany. Yet it is precisely the same logic at play in detention centres such as Abu 
Grahib or Guantanamo Bay, which operate legally under the exceptional measures of 
the so-called ‘War on Terror’, but extra-legally from the perspective of international 
law. These detention centres or camps are habitually located in peripheral spaces, 
outside of legitimate claims to sovereign territory, in order to circumvent, among 
other things, human rights legislation. Here, then, is the paradox on which the 
current argument pivots: the displacement of human beings to the periphery makes 
it possible for those wielding extra-legal power to treat these human beings as 
dehumanized bodies. 
As Agamben carefully traces, the location of the state of exception in the expression 
of sovereign power is very precisely tied to a biopolitics which exhibits itself most 
clearly in the capacity to reduce a human being to a bare life.58 Stated more directly, 
we encounter a brutal structural paradox: at the periphery, on the outside, it becomes 
infinitely possible to access the inside, the viscerality, of the human being. In what is 
undoubtedly one of the most extreme forms of risk management imaginable, the state 
of exception, the extra-legal periphery allows power to probe the recesses of being 
human, to exploit its weaknesses, its vulnerabilities – the soft spots of the body. Being 
outside is what provides access to the inside. In summation then, a visceral risk is a 
risk dislocated to the periphery, and by virtue of the state of exception59 relocated to 
particular bodies. 
In targeting the militant technocracies of the present, Beck has himself noted the 
similarities between risk and the exception in their shared capacity to suspend the 
prevailing rule of law: ‘[T]he expectation of catastrophe sets the political landscape 
in motion, opening up a power-play. New options appear on the table; risks can 
be exploited in order to gain power. This is the meeting point of the theory of risk 
society and Carl Schmitt’s reflections on state of emergency.’60 For, if it is true that 
in the contemporary world risk ‘is welcomed for its ability to suspend rules’,61 the 
consequences of this suspension invariably prove profoundly disturbing. 
Since risk is always asymmetrically distributed, and eminently redistributable, 
transposing the dubious financial logic of risk governance to the biopolitical sphere, 
it becomes all too easy to treat people and populations as mere abstractions. In such 
situations, the logic of risk is invariably used to justify the normalization of crisis 
and with it the exception: those who within the prevailing calculation of risk pose 
the greatest threat are themselves abstracted, excepted and physically displaced to the 
periphery. At the periphery the human is grasped in terms of its viscerality – almost 
coincidental to this risk calculation. 
 
Unremarkable: Radical risk at the apex of abstraction 
 
At the periphery, excluded from the protections afforded by law, it becomes clear 
precisely how the abstraction and displacement of risk become a source of great 
violence. Isolated, tortured and eventually driven to suicide, the body of Halpern’s 
detainee becomes a paradoxically visceral testament to the evisceration of our future 
under the totalizing regime of a calculus of risk. Deprived of rights and excepted from 
the application of law irrespective of guilt, the detainee becomes a carceral object, 
existentially impoverished. This point is clear, even from very start of the collection: A 
Square, A Cell, A Sentence: 
 
this blank resource whose waste excels, a darker place where bodies bend, ribs 
break in vaster banks, by blunting force, just say whose organ, say whose bone, 
drafting futures, time negated & not perceived as use, being raw, the stone, the 
teeth, what strange glamour, hangs like the sun, this deciduous mulch, his skin, 
the sky, the latch, the bone.62 
 
What darker space are we occupying here? Is it the cell or the grave, or perhaps the 
recesses of the unconscious? Is there a difference? What we do discover is a place of 
torture and dismemberment where the ‘body bends’ and ‘ribs break’. Thus we gain 
access to the eviscerated world of the autopsy report – an abstracted account of state-sanctioned 
violence; the forensic documentation of ‘times negated & not perceived 
as use’; a life reduced to ‘waste’, a ‘deciduous mulch’, a compost used to feed national 
fantasies of a militarized present and to justify the exceptional jurisdiction of a 
securitized state. What becomes apparent is the evisceration of the human subject 
alongside the abstraction of the human form: person made body, body made waste, 
waste made discourse, discourse put to ideological use. 
In countering the strategic use of this forensic discourse to gloss over this 
immeasurable violence – pushed to invisibility at the periphery, but unambiguous 
underpinning the state of exception – the poem takes on the burden of unwriting 
the abstract. Common Place takes shape as a transfigurative love poem: distorted, 
impossible, but opening a space where desire and shame, sexual pleasure and abjection, 
and, finally, life and death prove generatively interchangeable. Indeed, the question 
of interchangeability is central to the collection: generic, interchangeable, fungible, 
transferable or eminently substitutable are terms that Halpern uses repeatedly through 
Common Place to describe a mode of human being that has been utterly dismantled, 
turned inside-out, transformed into a broken network of viscera. This process of 
substitution and interchangeability is first registered in the redaction of the detainee’s 
name, marked in the text by a horizontal line between square brackets, [________]. 
Here then we find the apex of abstraction: a mere placeholder that is embedded in the 
text in multiple ways, but always allied to a diminishment of the visceral subject and 
an incapacity to signify. Reduced to a blank, the detainee is declared unremarkable, 
targeted, then erased by the calculus of risk: ‘The forehead reveals dark small 
raised lesions; see “Evidence of Injuries.” The eyes are unremarkable. The irises are 
brown. The cornea are slightly cloudy.’ A few lines later we find that ‘[t]he tongue is 
unremarkable. The lips are without evidence of injury. What would it be like to kiss 
them? Transcription of the autopsy report gives way to these fantasies of contact … 
The chest is unremarkable. But how can the chest be unremarkable? His chest can only 
be remarkable, inconceivable referent to which my love fails to cling;’ and finally, ‘[t]he 
external genitalia are those of a normal adult circumcised male, and unremarkable. I 
just lost my place in the document. I don’t want to continue doing this tonight, but I’ll 
keep it up, as if under duress’.63 
That this declared unremarkableness must be made remarkable requires it to become 
the object of near-religious devotion for the poet, the object of his ‘devotional kink’, as 
we have seen, for ‘[e]ach of these [abstracted characteristics declared unremarkable] 
deserves elaboration, friction, love’.64 The insistence on the torturous labour of tracing 
the ‘unremarkable’ is of particular significance, for what we encounter in this autopsy 
report, as already intimated, is, finally, the singularity of a subject made absolutely 
generic, absolutely interchangeable. The unremarkable is then what is unworthy of 
further commentary, unworthy of a second look. And it is precisely because this body is 
declared unremarkable, that it demands remark, demands our attention – an attention 
that through the incisive forensics of Halpern’s voice becomes scrutiny, giving a spectral 
form to the detainee’s lost viscerality. The more difficult feat of reanimating this loss, 
of accomplishing a task of public mourning, leads the poet to an impossible desire – 
indeed a desire for the impossible – which is precisely the inalienable desirability of 
every human life. 
In this process of poetic generativity, the text of the report in which ‘the detainee 
wavers between a vaguely whole figure of fantasy and a nightmare of fragments’65 itself 
acquires substantial agency. As the report is revisited, subjected to explicit readings, 
the object of so many quasi-pornographic revivifications through scrutiny, the report 
and its detainee themselves become, in a sense, capable of looking back – that is, of 
scrutinizing the poet and the reader – and thus of a species of agency that produces 
effects in the world. ‘The romance of Common Place is not a simple relationship of 
Halpern using a pornographic gaze to dominate and use this other, but the other’s 
refusal to be a compliant subject.’66 
Thus we should read this field of risk as a field of ambiguous exchange, where 
the body at risk and the risk of the poet are seen as confluent. Acutely aware of the 
impossibility of meaningfully equating the abstraction of language and the viscerality 
of the body, Halpern is driven to explore an affective zone where the two are reciprocal. 
It is the intensity of desire that seems to promise the means of exceeding this broken 
economy, reaching towards a visceral desire for the visceral itself as a path to a weak 
redemption of sorts. In Halpern’s own words, 
 
Once his body is admitted and a relation felt, narrative returns like the repressed, 
which had been there all along, spilling over the structure of my sentence, awaiting 
its own improper content. Plastic flexi-cuffs around his hands and a ligature said 
to be identical to the elastic band of his army-issued briefs, neutered on contact 
with my syntax, turning that part of him that has no name, the part to which 
my happiness clings, into the most fungible of things, his ‘unremarkable genitalia’.  
Still, I can run my tongue along their edge, forcing arousal while reading this 
report where the wrongness of my object-choice feels unavoidable … I submit to 
what I can’t master and spread my legs for his dreamy cock … There will always be 






The records redacted, the concrete incidents to which they refer rendered vague and 
fugitive, the work of the poet becomes one of bearing an impossible witness to that 
which evades the frame. The autopsy report provides only an oblique inventory of the 
prolonged torture and humiliation that the detainee must have endured – exceptional 
acts rendered unremarkable under the securitized gaze of the state of exception. The 
question that haunts Halpern is how it might be possible to retrieve even the trace of 
value from such encompassing waste, particularly when the detainee has been made to 
die at least two deaths: the physical death of his alleged suicide and the social death of 
his solitary confinement. How might it be possible to restore to the detainee some sort 
life from the posthumous violence of an autopsy report?68 
To understand Halpern’s response, and the extent of its risk, it is worth recalling a 
central and compelling point argued by Eleni Stecopoulos in her book Visceral Poetics: 
that language is not only a natural phenomenon, but a visceral phenomenon – of body, 
breath, voice, cavity: a system of resonances in visceral spaces that are reproduced in 
our systems of signification. Stecopoulos is particularly interested in the ways in which 
the body becomes multiply signified by language, at once fragmented and potentially 
reconstituted. The significance of poiesis and poetry in this process is considerable. 
Indeed, Stecopoulos offers a remarkable series of insights relating to the idea of poetic 
language as a kind of homeopathic cure. This will not happen at the level of simple 
cognition though, but rather by recognizing that language is always imbricated in 
the divisions of our body from itself, linking our idiolect or private language to our 
idiopathy or private symptom.69 In Stecopoulos’s estimation, a ‘visceral poetics is 
always a negotiation of wholes and fragments, pressures and voids, that corresponds 
for me not to triumph over the oppression of signification, but to a macaronic, ethnographic 
poetics endlessly seeking out language that could embody it as indeed all and 
nothing at once’.70 
It is by crossing a private idiolect of desire with the public discourse of the detainee’s 
radical undesirability that the hollowed-out signifiers of the autopsy report are 
reinjected with vigour. The poetry that emerges expresses what we might call an erotic 
thanatography – a literary language that is charged with the potential to write death 
back to life through the sublime transfiguration of absence and waste into a surfeit 
of value. Life, for Halpern, is both addressee and destination, and in this light both 
Music for Porn and Common Place must be read as tracts against death and as rituals 
of reanimation. The radical risk that Halpern takes lies in his refusal to accept the 
idea that the detainee has, in fact, been reduced to what Agamben would call a bare 
life, insisting instead on a weak potential for transfiguration glowing even in the most 
forbidden recesses of the abstracted body. For the parts of the autopsy, like the parts of 
the life and death narrative for which it is a substitute, never fully add up; and it is the 
generative power of the poem that promises to overcome the reduction of the body to 
a mere equation in a larger calculus of risk. 
In harnessing sexual desire to drive this erotic thanatography, Halpern seeks 
to counter the clinical thanatography of the autopsy report – once again to make 
remarkable what has been rendered unremarkable. What is witnessed here is nothing 
less than a reclamation of the exception. Where the state of exception constitutes the 
ground on which the most fundamental rights of the subject are completely usurped, 
displaced by a calculus of extreme risk management, here the detainee as exceptional 
figure is reinvested with a problematic, but still notable, agency. In this light, what 
Halpern risks is something profound. By relentlessly advocating for the right to 
desirability of even the most undesirable subjects we discover not an abstracted 
advocacy for universal human rights, but a visceral reassertion of these rights on 
the ground. This radical desirability discovers a forceful corollary in what Butler 
recognizes in terms of grievability: ‘Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the 
differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be 
grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain 
exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as a livable life 
and a grievable death?’71 Inserting desirability as a third term in this equation is a 
means of acknowledging the persistence of the body under the contemporary regimes 
of abstraction, or what we might otherwise call contemporary risk. The right to be 
grieved and the right to be desired are finally the visceral expression of the right to be 
loved. So fundamental are these to the human condition that deprived of these rights, 
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